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Abstract. Our paper studies linear temporal (with UNTIL and NEXT)
logic based at a conception of intransitive time. non-transitive time. In
particular, we demonstrate how the notion of knowledge might be rep-
resented in such a framework (here we consider logical operation N and
the operation until U (actually, the time overall) to be directed to past).
The basic mathematical problems we study are the fundamental ones
for any logical system - decidability and decidability w.r.t. admissible
rules. First, we consider the logic with non-uniform non-transitivity, and
describe how to solve the decidability problem for this logic. Then we
consider a modification of this logic - linear temporal logic with uniform
intransitivity and solve the problem of admissibility for inference rules.
A series of open problems is enumerated in the concluding part of the
paper.
Keywords: linear temporal logic, non-transitive time,
admissible rules, deciding algorithms, knowledge
1 Introduction
Temporal logic nowadays is an active area in Mathematical Logic, Philosophy,
Computer Science and Information Sciences. Historically, investigations of tem-
poral logic (in mathematical/philosophical logic) based at modal systems was
originated by Arthur Prior in late 1950s. Since then, temporal logic formed a
highly technical discipline actively using various versions of relational models
(cf. e.g. Gabbay and Hodkinson[8,9,10]).
Linear temporal logic LTL (with Until and Next) is a useful instrument (cf.
Manna, Pnueli [14,15], Vardi [28,29]) in CS and IS; LTL was used for analyzing
protocols of computations, check of consistency, etc. The decidability and satisfi-
ability problems for LTL, so to say main problems, were in focus of investigations
and were successfully resolved (cf. references above).
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An essential component of information sciences is the notion of knowledge
- a highly reliable information which is collected up to the moment and has
particular importance. This concept, and especially the one implemented via
multi-agent approach, is a popular area in Logic in Computer Science. Vari-
ous its aspects, including interaction and autonomy, effects of cooperation etc.
were investigated (cf. e.g.. Wooldridge et al [31,32,33], Lomuscio et al [13,4]). In
particular, knowledge in a multi-agent logic with distances was suggested and
studied, satisfiability problem for it was solved (Rybakov et al [22]).
Conception of Chance Discovery in multi-agents environment was considered
(Rybakov [23,24]); a logic modeling uncertainty via agents views was investigated
(cf. McLean et al [16]); representation of agent’s interaction (as a dual of the
common knowledge - an elegant conception suggested and profoundly developed
in Fagin et al [6]) was suggested in Rybakov [21,20].
Formalization for the conception of common knowledge was suggested and
technically developed in 1990x in a series of papers lately summarized in the book
Fagin et al [6], cf. also [17] for a refinement of the notion of common knowledge.
In this approach, as the majority of ones accepted later for working with logical
knowledge operations, the base was agents knowledge is represented as S5-like
modalities.
Generally speaking, an approach to model knowledge in terms of symbolic
logic, probably, may be dated to the end of 1950. At 1962 Hintikka [12] wrote the
book: Knowledge and Belief, - very likely the first book-length work to suggest
using modalities to capture the semantics of knowledge.
Nowadays, the field of knowledge representation and reasoning about knowl-
edge in logical framework is very popular area. Frequently modal and multi-
modal logics were used for formalizing agents reasoning. Such logics were, in
particular, suggested in Balbiani et al [5], Vakarelov [30], Fagin et al [6], Ry-
bakov [17,20]. Some up-to-date study of knowledge and believes in terms of
single-modal logic may be found in Halpern et al [11]. Modern approach to
knowledge frequently uses conception of justification in terms of epistemic logic
(cf. e.g.. Artemov et al [1,2]).
This our paper studies linear temporal logic (with nextN and until U) based
at intransitive time. the non-transitivity is a main point of novelty in this our
paper. We illustrate how the notion of knowledge might be represented in such
a framework. For this, we consider logical operation N and the operation until
U (actually, the time overall) to be directed to past.
The basic mathematical problems we study are the fundamental ones for
any logical system - decidability and decidability w.r.t. admissible rules. We
start with introductory general case - the logic with non-uniform intransitivity ,
as the illustration of the problem and describe how to solve decidability problem
for this logic (though the problem of recognizing admissible rules in this logic
remains yet to be open). Then we consider a modification of this logic - linear
temporal logic with uniform non-transitivity and solve problem of admissibility
for inference rules in this logic. This paper is a preparatory manuscript, where
we omit all mathematical proofs. A series of open problem is enumerated in the
conclusion.
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2 Initial Definitions, Notation, Known Facts
To make our manuscript easy readable (without looking for external literature)
we recall necessary definitions and notation concerning linear temporal logic.
The language of the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL in the sequel) extends the
language of Boolean logic by operations N (next) and U (until). The formulas
of LTL are built up from a set Prop of atomic propositions (synonymously -
propositional letters) and are closed under applications of Boolean operations,
the unary operation N (next) and the binary operation U (until). The formula
Nϕ has meaning: ϕ holds in the next time point (state); ϕUψ means: ϕ holds
until ψ will be true. Standard semantics for LTL consists of infinite transition
systems (runs, computations), formally they are linear Kripke structures based
on natural numbers.
The infinite linear Kripke structure is a quadruple M := 〈N ,≤,Next, V 〉,
where N is the set of all natural numbers; ≤ is the standard order on N , Next
is the binary relation, where a Next b means b is the number next to a. And V
is a valuation of a subset S of Prop.
That is, V assigns truth values to elements of S. So, for any p ∈ S, V (p) ⊆ N ,
V (p) is the set of all n from N where p is true (w.r.t. V ). The elements of N are
states (worlds), ≤ is the transition relation (which is linear in our case), and V
can be interpreted as labeling of the states with atomic propositions. The triple
〈N ,≤,Next〉 is a Kripke frame which we will denote for short by N .
For any Kripke structureM, the truth values can be extended from proposi-
tions of S to arbitrary formulas constructed from these propositions as follows:
∀p ∈ Prop (M, a) V p ⇔a ∈ N ∧ a ∈ V (p);
(M, a) V (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ (M, a) V ϕ ∧ (M, a) V ψ;
(M, a) V ¬ϕ ⇔not[(M, a) V ϕ];
(M, a) VNϕ ⇔∀b[(a Next b)⇒(M, b) V ϕ];
(M, a) V (ϕUψ) ⇔∃b[(a ≤ b) ∧ ((M, b) V ψ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(M, c) V ϕ]].
For a Kripke structure M := 〈N ,≤,Next, V 〉 and a formula ϕ with letters
from the domain of V , we say ϕ is valid in M (denotation –M ϕ) if, for any
b of M (b ∈ N ), the formula ϕ is true at b (denotation: (M, b) V ϕ).
The linear temporal logic LTL is the set of all formulas which are valid in all
infinite temporal linear Kripke structures M based on N with standard ≤ and
Next.
3 Non-transitive linear temporal logic LTLNT ,
Knowledge from PAST
This section contains primarily results about the non-transitive linear temporal
logic LTLNT with unbounded intransitivity. We need this technique to approach
in next section the admissibility problem. Here we will show how it works for
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decidability the logic LTLNT itself (this result was already recently submitted
in Rybakov [27]). We start from definition of a basic semantic tool - intransitive
linear frames. The idea of non-transitivity the time comes from observation that
passing knowledge from past to future is not so safe, and what has been mem-
orized in past, might be not remembered at present time. If we consider time
run, threads, as the ones in threads of computation, this idea looks yet more
attractive.
Definition 1. A linear non-transitive possible-worlds frame is
F := 〈N,≤,Next,
⋃
i∈N
[Ri]〉,
where each Ri is the standard linear order (≤) on the interval [i,mi], where mi ∈
N,mi > i and mi+1 > mi. We fix notation t(i) := mi; a Next b ⇔ b = a+ 1.
We now may define a model M on F by introduction a valuation V on F
and then we extend it on all formulas as earlier, but for formulas of sort ϕUψ
we define the truth value as follows:
Definition 2. For any a ∈ N :
(M, a) V (ϕ U ψ) ⇔
∃b[(aRab) ∧ ((M, b) V ψ) ∧ ∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(M, c) V ϕ]];
(M, a) VNϕ ⇔ [(a Next b) ⇒ (M, b) V ϕ].
Definition 3. The logic LTLNT is the set of all formulas which are valid at
any model M with any valuation.
3.1 Consider LTLNT to be directed in past, what means
knowledge?
Here we suggest somewhat very simple, but it seems anyway rather fundamental
and new, somewhat what matches very well with human experience and our
intuition. Knowledge, in a sense, is a temporal notion, depending as on present
time point we stay in, as well as on the observation for how long the information
contained in knowledge has been true in past (so to say the knowledge should
be stable enough from point of view to be true for a reasonable time interval in
past.).
Time is very enigmatic, abstract concept (Maybe not too much abstract, as
comes to us not only via internal individual perception but also via wast scientific
base: physics, universe studying sciences, etc., etc. But here and there it is used
as rather a measure of processes; but what is about its internal structure, its
laws, its origin?), but anyway trivial observations about it are evident:
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(i) Human beings remember (at least some) past, but
(ii) they do not know future at all (rather could surmise what will happen in
immediate proximity time step);
(iii) individual memory tells to us that the time in past was linear
(though it might be only our perception).
So, there is a good reason to formalize it with linear temporal logic LTLNT
with time diverted to past. Knowledge in temporal perspective is also attractive
object to study by technique of this logic. Knowledge always have to be accepted
as true by a reasonably big, not simply representative, group of experts, as it
was suggested from the very beginning of logical study the notion of knowledge
(cf. Fagin R., Halpern, J. Moses Y., Vardi M (1995), [6]).
This might be formalized via more or less standard approach with multi-
agent logics. Though, we would like to present here only base of our approach
when the agent is only an individual which review knowledge. He/she posses the
knowledge as much as he/she yet remember it - at most in the own life span.
The obtained knowledge may be refereed to an another individual which from
it was obtained by the current one in past, etc. But not all knowledge may be
transferred from ancestors - previous agents – to their offsprings, – from past to
future. This is why it is relevant to formalize time as non-transitive.
No big deal to reformulate these observations for interpretation of computa-
tion - past threads of computation, passing intermediate results of computational
runs, analyses of computational protocols etc. This is why we base our approach
on formalization with non-transitive time.
Thus, if we consider our LTLNT with frames diverted to PAST, and NEXT
to be PREVIOUS, this would allow as rather sharply express and formalize this
approach. E.g.
Examples :
(M, a) VKϕ ⇔ (M, a) V ϕ U [[N
m+1¬ϕ] ∧ [Nmϕ]].
Here K acts to say that knowledge codded by ϕ been achieved only m ‘years’
ago and holds true since then. This example works even in the linear temporal
logic LTL itself.
(M, a) VK1ϕ ⇔ (M, a) V✷¬ϕ ∧✸(¬ϕ ∧N(Kϕ)).
Now K1 determines that ϕ was wrong in all observable time in past, but before
it has been time interval of length m, when ϕ was true (so to say it was a local
temporal knowledge).
(M, a) VK2ϕ ⇔ (M, a) V ✷
k¬ϕ ∧✸k(¬ϕ ∧N(Kϕ)).
Here K2 says that ϕ was wrong in subsequent k ‘memorable’ intervals in
time, but then it has been in past a local knowledge for a time interval of length
m.
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Even with these simple examples it is easy to imagine which wide possibilities
for expression properties of knowledge in time perspective might be achieved
via assumption that time could be non-transitive. Below we argument why the
conception of time in CS and KR may be based on intransitive time.
4 Discussion: Intransitivity, what is Knowledge in
Perspective of Time
We start from observations about knowledge. Here we will use the unary logical
operations Ki with meaning - it is a logical knowledge operation. (Below we will
consider models for LTL with interpretation that Next and time accessibility
relation are actually directed to past, so ≤ means - to be earlier.) So, what could
be classified as to be knowledge?
(i) Simple approach: when knowledge was discovered once and
since then it always seen to be true:
(N, a) VK1ϕ ⇔∃b[(N, b+ 1) 1V ϕ) ∧ (a ≤ b) ∧ (N, b) V ϕ)∧
∀c[(a ≤ c < b)⇒(N, c) V ϕ]].
From first glance, it is a rather plausible interpretation. As bigger b will be,
as it would be most reasonable to consider ϕ as a knowledge. But for a = b
this definition actually says to us nothing, this definition then admits one-day
knowledge, which is definitely not good.
(ii) Rigid approach from temporal logic: knowledge if always was true:
(N, a) VK2ϕ ⇔(N, a) V ¬(⊤U¬ϕ).
That is fine, though it is too rigid, - it assumes that we know all past (and
besides it does not admit that knowledge was obtained only since a particular
time point).
(iii) Knowledge since parameterizing facts:
(N, a) VKψϕ ⇔(N, a) V ϕUψ.
This means ϕ has the stable truth value - true, since some event happened
in past (which is modeled now by ψ to be true at a state). Thus, as soon as ψ
happened to be true in past , ϕ always held true until now. Here we use standard
until. The formula ψ may have any desirable value, so, we obtain knowledge since
ψ.
(iv) Approach: via agents knowledge as voted truth for the valuation:
This is very well established area, cf. the book Fagin et al [6] and more
contemporary publications e.g. - Rybakov [17,20].
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But, we would like to look at it from an another standpoint. Earlier knowledge
operations (agents knowledge) were just unary logical operations Ki interpreted
as S5-modalities, and knowledge operations were introduced via the vote of
agents, etc.
We would like to suggest here somewhat very simple but anyway rather fun-
damental and it seems new. We assume that all agents have their own valuations
at the frame N . That is we have n-much agents, and n-much valuations Vi and,
as earlier, the truth values w.r.t. Vi of any propositional letter pj at any world
a ∈ N . From an applications viewpoint, Vi correspond to agents information
about truth of statements pj (statements in this information may be different,
differ on true/false). So, Vi is just individual information.
How the information can be turned into local knowledge? One way is the
voted value of truth: we consider a new valuation V , w.r.t. which pi is true at
a if majority (with chosen confidence, we may use approach from fuzzy logic if
we wish), biggest part of agents, believes that pi is true at a. Then we obtain a
model with a single (standard) valuation V , as earlier. Next, we can apply any
of the known approaches. And knowledge may be interpreted in many ways, in
particular, as it was offered here above.
But then, simultaneously, we also may consider all old individual truth val-
uations Vi for all composed formulas ϕ (in a standard manner) and definitions
for knowledge operations for any agent i (they may be different), together with
general knowledge operations (accepted by all/majority agents) that depend on
achieved earlier (as above) global valuation V on propositional statements. Of
course, we may use much more temporal features, for example:
(v) Approach: via agents knowledge as resolution at evaluation state.
Here we suggest a way starting similar as in the case (iv) above until the
introduction of different valuations Vi of agent truth values for letters coding
truth of statements. We now suggest
(N, a) VKϕ ⇔∀i[(N, a) Vi✸ϕ ∧ ✷[¬ϕ→ N¬ϕ]
and
(N, a) ViKϕ ⇔∀i[(N, a) Vi✸ϕ ∧ ✷[¬ϕ→ N¬ϕ]
Thus, in this case, we will allow usage of nested knowledge operations for K
in formulas for any truth valuation Vi of any agent i and also for the global truth
valuation V . The decision procedures (for the logics based at this approach) are
not known nowadays. We think that to resolve it is an interesting open problem.
Summarizing these observations, we think that the linear temporal logic is a
very promising instrument for determination and elicitation of logical knowledge.
In the sequel, our approach for various kind of logical knowledge operations will
be based on an assumption that knowledge is a true fact, which observed and
widely acknowledged to be true in past for reasonable time, and remained always
true until now. However we would like to alleviate the request for time to be
transitive (and then to base our approach on a suggested modification).
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Why Time might be Non-Transitive.
View (i). Time in individual perception: time in past has been as much as I
remember.
The option explains itself very well. An agent today may not remember what
he/she/it remembered some years ago. Here we do not make any reference to
truth or knowledge, only to individual perception, ability to remember events.
Though, it might be that what was truth and knowledge earlier is not anymore
today.
View (ii). Computational view. Inspections of protocols for computations
are limited by time resources and have non-uniform length (yet, in any point of
inspection, verification may refer to stored old protocols). Therefore, if we inter-
pret our models as the ones reflecting verification of computations, the amount
of records for past inspections of protocols is finite, limited. And not all of them
might be inspected in the given time point.
View (iii). Agents-admins view. We may consider states (worlds of our
model) as checkpoints of admins (agents) for the inspection of recorded states of
the network in the past. Any admin has allowed amount of inspections for pre-
vious states, but only within the areas of its(his/her) responsibility (by security
or another reasons). So, the accessibility to past records in time is not transitive
again.
View (iv). Agents-users view. If we consider the states of the models as the
content of web pages available for users, and any web link as the accessibility
relation, then starting from any web page user may achieve, using links in hy-
pertext(s) some available by links web sites etc. The latter ones may have web
links which are available only for individuals possessing passwords for accessibil-
ity. And users having password may continue web surf, etc. Clearly that in this
approach, web browsing looks as non-transitive relation. Here, if we interpret
web browsing as time-steps, the accessibility is intransitive.
View (v). View on time in past for collecting knowledge. In human percep-
tion, only some finite intervals of time in past are available to individuals to
inspect evens and to record knowledge collected to current time state. The time
is past in our feelings looks as linear and any individual has only a finite amount
of memory to remember information and events. There, in past, at foremost
available (remembered) time point, individuals again had a remembered interval
of time with collected information, and so forth ... So, the time in past, generally
speaking, looks as not transitive form viewpoint of extending knowledge (since
transition of the one from past to future might lose some).
View (vi). View in past for individuals as agents with opposition. Here the
comment is similar to the case (iv) above, but we may consider the knowledge
as the collection of facts which about only the majority (not compulsory all) of
experts (agents) have affirmative positive opinion. And, in past time, the voted
opinion of experts about facts could be different at distinct time points. Besides
the time intervals remembered by experts might be very diverse (for distinct
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experts in past). Therefore in this approach the time relation again looks as
non-transitive from viewpoint of safe collection of information.
4.1 Technique allowing us to prove decidability of LTLNT itself
Recall that a (sequential) (inference) rule is an expression
r :=
ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕl(x1, . . . , xn)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
,
where ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕl(x1, . . . , xn) and ψ(x1, . . . , xn) are formulas con-
structed out of letters (variables) x1, . . . , xn. Meaning of r is: ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
(which is called conclusion) follows (logically follows) from ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . ,
ϕl(x1, . . . , xn) .
Definition 4. A rule r is said to be valid in a model M if and only if the
following holds: [∀a ((M, a) V
∧
1≤i≤l ϕi)] ⇒ [∀a ((M, a) V ψ)]. Otherwise
we say r is refuted in M, or refuted in M by V , and write M 1V r. A rule r
is valid in a frame F (notation F r) if it is valid in any model based at F .
For any formula ϕ, we can transform ϕ into the rule x→ x/ϕ and employ a
technique of reduced normal forms for inference rules as follows. We start from
self-evident
Lemma 1. For any formula ϕ, ϕ is a theorem of LTLNT (that is ϕ ∈ LTLNT )
iff the rule (x→ x/ϕ) is valid in any frame F .
Definition 5. A rule r is said to be in reduced normal form if r = ε/x1 where
ε :=
∨
1≤j≤l
[
∧
1≤i≤n
x
t(j,i,0)
i ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
(Nxi)
t(j,i,1)∧
∧
1≤i,k≤n,i6=k
(xiUxk)
t(j,i,k,1)]
always t(j, i,m), t(j, i, k, 1),∈ {0, 1} and, for any formula α above,
α0 := α, α1 := ¬α.
Definition 6. Given a rule rnf in reduced normal form, rnf is said to be a
normal reduced form for a rule r iff, for any frame F for LTLNT ,
F  r ⇔ F  rnf .
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm running in (single) exponential time,
which, for any given rule r, constructs its reduced normal form rnf .
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Here we will need a simple modification of models for LTLNT introduced
earlier. Let as earlier F := 〈N,≤,Next,
⋃
i∈N [Ri]〉, where each Ri is the standard
linear order (≤) on the interval [i,mi], where mi ∈ N,mi > i and mi+1 > mi,
as before, and yet t(i) := mi. If a Next b we will write Next(a) = b.
For any natural number r, consider the following frame F(N(r)) based at
the initial interval of the frame F : F(N(r)) := 〈N(r),≤,Next,
⋃
i∈N [Ri]〉, where
r > g ≥ t2(0), the base set N(r) of this frame is
N(r) := [0, t(0)] ∪ [t(0), t2(0)] ∪ · · · ∪ [tg(0), tg+1(0)]∪, . . . ,∪[tr(0), tr+1(0)],
where the relations Ri and Next act on this frame exactly as at F but (i)
Next(tr+1(0)) := tg(0) and (ii) Ri acts on [t
r(0), tr+1(0)] as if the next interval
for [tr(0), tr+1(0)] would be [tg(0), tg+1(0)]. The valuation V on such finite frame
might be defined as before, and we may extend it to formulas with U and N
similar as before.
Lemma 2. For any given rule rnf in reduced normal form, if rnf is refuted in a
frame of F then rnf can be refuted in some finite model F(N(r)) (where r ∈ N)
by a valuation V where the size of the frame F(N(r)) is effectively computable
from the size of the rule of rnf (is at most [(n ∗ l) ∗ l(n∗l) ∗ (n ∗ l)!] + l(n∗l), where
l is the number of disjuncts in rnf and n is the number of its letters).
Lemma 3. If a rule rnf in reduced normal form is refuted in a model described
in the lemma above then rnf is not valid in LTLNT , i.e there is a standard frame
F refuting rnf .
Using these Lemmas we immediately derive:
Theorem 2. (Rybakov [27]) Logic LTLNT is decidable; the satisfiability prob-
lem for LTLNT is decidable: for any formula we can compute if it is satisfiable
and if yes to compute a valuation satisfying this formula in a finite model of kind
F(N(r)).
The main problem we interested in this paper is the admissibility problem.
Recall that
Definition 7. The rule
r :=
ϕ1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , ϕl(x1, . . . , xn)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn)
,
is said to be admissible in a logic L if, for every tuple of formulas, α1, . . . , αn,
we have ψ(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L whenever ∀i [ϕi(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ L].
We currently cannot answer the question about recognizing admissibility in
LTLNT , but we are able to do it for its restricted version, what we describe in
next section.
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5 Main Results, Logics with Uniform Bound for
Intransitivity, Admissible Rules
We consider some variation of LTLNT - its extension, the logic generated by
models with uniformly bounded measure of non-transitivity.
Definition 8. A non-transitive possible-worlds linear frame F with uniform
non-transitivity m is a particular case of frames for LTLNT :
F := 〈N,≤,Next,
⋃
i∈N
[Ri]〉,
where each Ri is the standard linear order (≤) on the interval [i, i +m], where
(m ≥ 1), and m is a fixed natural number (measure of intransitivity).
So, the only distinction from our general case in the previous section is that
instead of arbitrary measure on intransitivity mi for any world i, we consider
the same and fixed one - m. It looks as we assume that all agents always mast
remember the same interval of the time in past - the one with length m.
Definition 9. The logic LTLNT (m) is the set of all formulas which are valid
at any model M with the measure of intransitivity m.
It seems that to consider and discuss such logic is reasonable, since we may
put limitations on the size of time intervals that agents (experts) may introspect
in future (or to remember in past). First immediate, easy observation about
LTLNT (m) is
Proposition 1. Logic LTLNT (m) is decidable.
Proof is trivial since for verification if a formula of temporal degree k is a
theorem of LTLNT (m) we will need to check it on only initial part of the frames
consisting only k + 1 subsequent intervals of length at most m each. Q.E.D.
Now we briefly compare this new logic with the original one.
Proposition 2. LTL * LTLNT and LTL * LTLNT (m) for all m.
Proof is evident since ✷p→ ✷✷P ∈ LTL.
Proposition 3. LTLNT (m) * LTL for all m.
Proof is evident since
(
∧
i≤m
Nip → ✷p) ∈ LTLNT (m).
Nonetheless, the following, nontrivial statement, holds:
Theorem 3. LTLNT ⊂ LTL.
The main new result obtained in this paper is the solution of the admissibility
problem for logics LTLNT (m):
Theorem 4. For anym, the linear temporal logic with UNIFORM non-transitivity
LTLNT (m) is decidable w.r.t. admissibility of inference rules.
12 V.Rybakov
6 Open problems
We think the following open questions could be of interest:
(i) Decidability of LTLNT itself w.r.t. admissible inference rules.
(ii) Decidability w.r.t. admissible rules for the variant of LTLNT (m) with
non-uniform intransitivity.
(iii) The problems of axiomatization for LTLNT and for LTLNT (m).
(iv) It looks reasonable to extend our approach to linear logics with linear
non-transitive but continues time.
(v) Multi-agent approach to suggested framework when any n ∈ N would be
represented by a cluster (circle) with m agents’ knowledge relations Ki is also
open and interesting.
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